Cuba has reached a breaking point that even its crisis-hardened leadership cannot ignore. It is running out of fuel amid US pressure, having last received oil on January 9 from Mexico. This has prompted airlines such as Air Canada to cancel all flights to Cuba, hitting the tourism lifeline that accounts for most of the island’s foreign currency.
Massive power outages are now routine, and the UN has warned of a possible "humanitarian collapse" if Cuba’s oil needs go unmet. For the first time in decades, Cuba’s 67-year-old regime faces a crisis where its traditional survival tools – external bailouts, mass emigration and austerity – may no longer be enough.
Hostility between the US and Cuba dates back to 1960, when the newly socialist Cuban state nationalised American assets. Havana’s subsequent cold war alignment with Moscow then prompted an embargo in 1962 that prohibited almost all trade between the US and Cuba. Since then, Washington’s approach has cycled between pressure and limited engagement.
However, Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 has produced the most aggressive strategy in decades. And following the recent US capture and replacement of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro, which resulted in Cuba losing its main oil patron, Washington has moved to close the island’s remaining energy lifelines. It has done so by threatening tariffs on countries that ship fuel to Cuba.
The Trump administration’s message to Havana is blunt: negotiate a deal on US terms or face an energy collapse that could push Cuba into a new “special period” (a reference to the 1990s when Cuba experienced severe economic crises after the dissolution of the Soviet Union). Havana has few options but to negotiate.
Trump and his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, have framed this operation as the next chapter in their effort to roll back left-wing regimes in the western hemisphere. But despite this rhetoric, Washington’s goals are more strategic than they are ideological.
This is partly because delivering regime change in Cuba would be difficult. The regime has a strict ideological grip over the population and military that extends far beyond the current Cuban leader, Miguel Díaz-Canel. This makes it unlikely that removing him from office would bring about any real change.
The White House is most likely seeking a Cuba that is less of a security problem, less of a migration pressure valve and more of an economic opportunity – even if it remains formally communist.
What does the US want?
Preventing another mass exodus of Cubans to the US is a central objective. Over the past five years, more than 1 million Cubans have left their country, with hundreds of thousands entering the US. Trump has tightened those channels and has deported some recent arrivals, signalling that the “escape valve” that has helped Havana manage discontent is closing.
Any deal will therefore prioritise the Cuban government’s cooperation in discouraging departures, as well as guaranteeing its acceptance of deportation flights. Washington will also want to secure commitments from Cuba’s leaders to maintain basic social order so a humanitarian emergency does not spill into a migration crisis.
Meanwhile, the US has become alarmed in recent years by Cuba’s role as a listening post and foothold for its rivals. China has invested in intelligence facilities there aimed at intercepting US communications, while Russia signed a new military cooperation pact with Cuba in 2025.
Trump and Rubio may well see the energy chokehold as a chance to force Havana to close specific Chinese and Russian facilities or block future bases. Also likely are demands for some form of monitoring or transparency to reassure Washington that these activities are being rolled back.
At the same time, the Trump administration will see a commercial upside. Cuba’s infrastructure is in tatters and years of mismanagement, US dollar shortages and rules blocking profit repatriation have scared off investors. But the island’s beaches, ports and location still offer long‑term potential.
In any deal, US negotiators would likely push for a significant expansion of the private sector, as well as access for US and allied companies in tourism, energy generation, grids, ports, telecoms and logistics. Crucially, Washington will want some guarantees that foreign investors can repatriate profits.
Many tourism businesses in Cuba are currently controlled by Grupo de Administración Empresarial (Gaesa), a military-run conglomerate that controls about half the economy. So a gradual loosening of Gaesa’s economic control, or at least clearer rules and partnerships that give foreign firms more say, are probable US demands.
This would not mean a wholesale “opening” overnight. The Cuban military would still control much of the commanding heights. But it would create real stakes for US and European businesses in the island’s gradual economic recovery.
Finally, Trump and Rubio need something more immediate they can sell to domestic audiences as proof that pressure has “worked”. Yet they are also wary of triggering uncontrolled regime collapse. That tension points towards symbolic, calibrated steps rather than full democratisation.
This is likely to involve the release of a number of political prisoners, especially those jailed after protests in 2021. It may also see controls on internet access and independent civic activity eased, and possibly some limited experiments with more competitive local elections.
What Washington wants in Cuba is not an immediate transition, but a narrative: that US pressure forced a long‑closed regime to crack the door open, creating space for future change while avoiding a sudden vacuum close to its shores.
For Cuba’s leaders, the priority is regime survival. They will give ground most readily on economic and foreign policy issues, where concessions can be packaged as tactical and reversible. But they are likely to resist anything that looks like real power‑sharing at home.
That makes a deal centred on fuel, finance, migration control and a partial strategic realignment the most likely near‑term outcome. Cuba’s political system will bend at the margins, yet it is unlikely that the US administration will want to break the regime entirely.
~ theconversation.com
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